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Posted  16 June 2006

 

A tragedy of failures and false expectations

 

This month, the American University in Cairo’s Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program published a comprehensive report on the background, events and aftermath of the sit-in and forced removal of Sudanese protestors outside UNHCR’s Cairo office at the end of 2005.

 

The following are excerpts from the comments and recommendations section of the 68-page report. The full report is available from FMRS here.

 

                      

A series of failures on the part of the Egyptian government and UNHCR, combined with unrealistic expectations and grave miscalculations on the part of the demonstrators and their leaders, resulted in the tragedies of the forced eviction. This is a complicated story with many actors, each of whom bears some level of responsibility for the unnecessary deaths of so many people, including 12 children, and the physical injuries and psychological damage to hundreds more. The incident further damaged already strained relations between UNHCR and refugees and between UNHCR and the government, as well as to the government of Egypt and its reputation as a host country. It will take a long time to repair this damage.

 

 

Egyptian Government

 

The government showed remarkable restraint over the three months of the sit-in, but came under increasing pressure from UNHCR, the local media, and residents to remove the protesters. Under the Egyptian Emergency Law, the gathering was manifestly illegal, and it is to the government’s credit that such a long period of time was given for the peaceful resolution of the issues between the demonstrators and UNHCR. Given the failure of negotiations, however, it was inevitable that the Egyptian authorities eventually intervene.

 

During the removal, Egyptian security forces did not offer protesters the choice to disperse peacefully, which might have averted the violence that occurred. Instead, a decision was apparently made at the highest levels to remove the demonstrators to unidentified detention centers. ...

 

Egyptian security used excessive and disproportionate force in removing the protesters, leaving no alternatives or avenues for escape. No allowances were made for the safety of the park’s occupants, especially vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, and the sick. Security forces entered the park from all directions at once, leaving nowhere for people to flee. They used indiscriminate violence, and there was no immediate medical attention available to injured protesters. Inadequate training in crowd control methods does not adequately explain the high number of casualties and injuries that resulted. ...

 

With attention focused on asylum seekers and refugees, and the issue discussed openly in the People’s Assembly, this may be an opportune time for the government to seriously consider the passage of domestic legislation to detail and systematize Egypt’s obligations under the 1951 and OAU refugee conventions, as well as to make its policies and procedures clear. ...

 

 

UNHCR

 

UNHCR’s mandate is the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. From the beginning of the sit-in, however, the agency adopted a hostile and confrontational attitude toward the protesting asylum seekers, refugees, and closed files. It issued statements that accused the protesters of everything from rumor-mongering to outright deception. It suggested that the demonstrators were not of concern to UNHCR, given that they included closed files and persons the agency claimed were economic migrants. UNHCR also implied that the protesters were responsible for keeping other, non-Sudanese asylum seekers away from its offices although the decision to “'close” the office was made by UNHCR itself. The agency’s claims drove a wedge between the various communities of concern and exacerbated the lack of communication between UNHCR and asylum seekers and refugees. Its attitude served to confirm the protesters’ grievances and frustrations.

 

Throughout the sit-in, UNHCR exercised tight control over its public posture vis-à-vis the protest. It refused to allow its staff to go the Moustafa Mahmoud Park and interact with the refugees directly until December 17. The agency leadership insisted on meeting and negotiating only with the leaders of the demonstration, even as it was denouncing them as “self-appointed” and accusing them of creating false expectations to lure people to the park.

 

In early statements, UNHCR placed itself squarely on the side of the government of Egypt, citing mutual concerns and interests. It repeatedly asked authorities to remove the protesters, albeit “peacefully,” without demanding any substantive assurances that the intervention would indeed be peaceful. ...

 

UNHCR took a number of grave risks concerning the safety of the population in the park. It must accept accountability for a number of failures and miscalculations that, at least indirectly, led to the tragic results.

 

 

The Protesters

 

Leaders of the protest and the protesters generally must also bear some of the responsibility for the incident. The protesters remained adamant about their demands throughout the three months and refused to accept any compromise that may have ended the protest, such as that offered by UNHCR in the failed December 17 agreement. While the protest leaders did accept and sign the agreement with UNHCR, dissenting voices within the park succeeded in overturning the decision, despite warnings from supporters and friends, and convinced others to continue the protest.

 

It is understandable that the level of frustration that led to the protest in the first place and the sense of unity and solidarity achieved during the three months militated against a compromise. Nevertheless, the protesters should have been aware of the low likelihood that the authorities would allow the sit-in to continue indefinitely or that it would end peacefully. This was not the first time that authorities reacted violently to demonstrations in Egypt. Many refugees in Cairo have firsthand experience of police brutality, and the refugee demonstration in August 2004 was broken up violently. ...

 

The protesters do not seem to have considered or planned for a possible intervention by the authorities. Some demonstrators thought they were under UNHCR rather than Egyptian government jurisdiction, and thus felt protected from the state’s intervention. Given the number of vulnerable people in the park, especially children, the lack of planning by protest organizers was a tragic oversight.

 

The accountability of victims of violence is a complex and sensitive matter that is impossible to address here. It may be enough to say that the protest leaders had a responsibility to those who elected and followed them, and a particular responsibility to protect children and particularly vulnerable adults.

 

 

Long-term Thematic Issues

 

A number of issues arise that require serious consideration by all parties if such a tragedy is to be averted in the future. They are the same problems and issues that led to the protest, and long-term solutions and programs are required to resolve or at least to ameliorate the frustration and hopelessness that asylum seekers and refugees in Egypt feel. These issues include problems of communication and trust, the provision of adequate services that make life livable even in limbo, and a redefinition of responsibilities and roles.

 

 

Information

 

Topping the list is the need for adequate, thorough, and helpful information for asylum seekers and refugees in Egypt. The rumor mill that often plagues newcomers and long-term residents in Cairo and creates false and unrealistic expectations has to be dealt with in an active and comprehensive manner, involving everyone concerned. …

 

UNHCR, the Egyptian government, and organizations that serve refugee communities need to improve access to authoritative, useful information for asylum seekers, refugees, and closed files, as well as for Egyptian society and Sudanese community members. ... Refugees must know the policies of resettlement countries, the political dynamics developing between Egypt and Sudan as well as Egypt and UNCHR, and developments in relations between UNHCR and the population of concern. …

 

This recommendation applies not only to the need for accurate and helpful information, but also to a reconsideration of its purposes. Beyond simply informing refugees about a particular fact or service, the parties involved must clarify why such a fact or service needs to be known and how to make use of it. ...

 

UNHCR has a particular responsibility to coordinate efforts in this regard. There has been a longstanding problem of communication between refugees and UNHCR, and the agency needs to reexamine the “fortress mentality” it periodically exhibits. …

 

 

 

Racism

 

Part of each party’s effort to disseminate accurate information should be to overcoming the reasons people sometimes stay away from, for example, certain service centers for reasons of assumed racism or selectivity. In this regard, Cairo’s Sudanese community has a significant responsibility to ensure that accurate information is available to refugees, to dispel damaging rumors and unrealistic expectations, and to attempt to break down self-marginalizing

Attitudes and behaviors. This, however, needs to be complemented by serious educational efforts aimed at Egyptian society generally, to confront the racist attitudes demonstrated by sectors of the general public and by Egyptian media, security forces, and police. …

 

The charge of racism has often been levied at the private security personnel employed by UNHCR itself. It is incumbent upon UNHCR to ensure adequate training for its personnel, even if they are formally employed by a private security firm. In the final analysis, UNHCR is responsible for the treatment of its clients from the moment they first approach its offices.

 

 

Living Conditions

 

Both the government of Egypt and Sudanese asylum seekers see Egypt as a transit country for refugees. They share a preference for rejecting longer-term

programs that may ameliorate difficult living conditions with the expectation that, soon enough, refugees will be resettled to another country. Experience has shown that relatively few are resettled and that the majority has to resign itself to many years of life in limbo. ... They need a life as normal as possible even if the legal situation is temporary and the future has yet to be resolved. This is the purpose of the rights granted to asylum seekers and refugees by virtue of the 1951 Convention.

 

In Closing

 

Six months after the violent breakup of the demonstration, the situation for refugees is as difficult as it has ever been, and in some cases even worse. Many employers have dismissed Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers out of a generalized fear of “trouble,” and youth violence in the community is escalating to dangerous levels. ... The population of refugees in Egypt continues to fend for itself, for the most part, dealing with the same constraints, hostilities, and difficulties it has always dealt with in the effort to survive and find some avenue for hope.

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